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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the impact of institutions on the innovation level of countries. This analysis is performed by 
segregating the dimension of institution into two, namely formal institutions and informal institutions. Using samples of 
62 cross-section countries and employing robust standard error ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, this study has 
found evidence that both formal and informal institutions affect the innovation level of countries. The results suggest 
that countries with higher formal institutions (institutional quality) and higher informal institutions (social capital) are 
associated with higher innovation levels. However, informal institutions demonstrate that at 10th percentile quantile 
estimations it exhibit a significant positive impact on innovation, while the formal institutions show such impact after 
exceeding the 50th percentile. Hence, this result suggests the formal institutions play important role when innovation level 
in a country is high. Both formal and informal institutions are crucial in influencing the level of country’s innovation.
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ABSTRAK
Kajian ini menganalisis impak institusi terhadap tahap inovasi dalam sesebuah negara. Analisis ini dijalankan dengan 
membahagikan dimensi institusi kepada dua, iaitu institusi formal dan institusi tidak formal. Dengan menggunakan 
sampel dari 62 buah negara keratan rentas dan ralat piawai mantap kuasa dua terkecil (OLS), hasil dapatan kajian 
menunjukkan bahawa institus rasmi dan institusi tidak rasmi mempengaruhi tahap inovasi sesebuah negara. Hasil 
dapatan kajian mencadangkan bahawa negara-negara yang mempunyai institusi formal (kualiti institusi) dan tidak 
formal (modal sosial) yang tinggi adalah berkaitan dengan tahap innovasi yang tinggi. Bagaimanapun, institusi tidak 
formal menunjukkan bahawa pada 10 anggaran kuantil persentil ia mempamerkan kesan positif yang signifikan kepada 
inovasi, manakala institusi formal menunjukkan kesan tersebut selepas melebihi persentil ke-50. Justeru, keputusan 
ini menunjukkan institusi formal memainkan peranan penting apabila tahap inovasi dalam sesebuah negara berada 
pada tahap yang lebih tinggi. Kedua-dua institusi formal dan tidak formal adalah penting dalam mempengaruhi tahap 
inovasi sesebuah negara.
Kata kunci: Inovasi; institusi; modal sosial
INTRODUCTION
In a capitalist economy, “change” is an everlasting 
evolution that never can be stationary. As Schumpeter 
(1942) wrote “This evolutionary character of market 
process is not merely motivated by the ever-changing 
social or natural environment such as wars, revolutions 
and changes in social structure which alters the economic 
action; nor due to quasi-automatic factors such as increase 
in population, capital or vagaries of monetary systems”. 
Rather, the engine of market evolution comes from the 
intention of firms or enterprises in discovering new 
consumers, product, markets and methods of production”. 
In simple words, market evolution is simply driven by 
firms’ profit oriented behavior. This trait is clearer in 
modern day economies that are driven by the norm of 
globalization.
In micro perspective, competitiveness is the key 
for firms’ survival and growth in modern economies. 
For that reason, developing new products and services 
becomes a regular activity for today’s firms’ in 
order to maintain their uniqueness and to keep their 
products heterogeneous from rival firms. Investment in 
innovation is indeed motivated by the desire of firms to 
secure higher market share, which may receive short-run 
monopoly profit. Besides that, continuous innovation 
becomes essential for continued viability as firms might 
become obsolete by the process of creative destruction. 
The interaction between firms is thus important to the 
nation’s economic performance. For the economy 
as a whole, innovative activity such as research and 
development will boost technological advancement 
and hence productivity which is a crucial element for 
economic growth.
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Up until recently, most of the previous literature on 
innovation has focused on its impact toward economic 
growth and its determinant factors such as foreign direct 
investment, trade openness and human capital (Cheung & 
Lin 2004; Dahlman 1994; Romer 1990; Blackburn, Hung 
& Pozzolo 2000; Tebaldi & Elmslie 2008). However, 
there is little discussion about the importance of the 
institutional environment on innovation. Undoubtedly, 
R&D expenditure and qualified labor are essential 
for initiating innovative activity. Nonetheless, equal 
amount of resources injected into different countries 
may yield different innovative gains. This is because the 
institutional framework and quality of R&D personnel 
can differ greatly between countries. On this matter, 
most current established institution-innovation empirical 
evidence is focused on formal institutions (governance) 
while little attention is given to informal institutions 
(social capital)1. Social capital such as trust, norms and 
networks are an important indicator for the initiation 
of innovative activity. Hence, further examination on 
the impact of different institutional dimensions (e.g. 
governance and social capital) on innovative activity 
might able to explain why some countries tend to have 
low innovation level. 
In response to this, this paper attempts an empirical 
analysis on the relationship between institutions and 
innovation. Specifically, it serves two essential objectives. 
First, few studies have regressed the institutional quality 
factor on innovation especially with regards to social 
institutions because they are difficult to measure and 
quantify. Such rare literature includes Wang (2013) 
where they used the governance institution factor to 
explain cross-countries innovation differences. In this 
study, we extend this view by splitting the institutions 
into two, namely, governance institutions and social 
capital. The motivation of this research objective is to 
highlight that the impact of institutions on innovation 
occurs in two ways. While reputable law structure and 
efficient government are the factors that encourage 
innovative activity, social capital such as trust is also 
an informal institution that matters to the initiation of 
innovative activities. Comparing the formal and informal 
institution’s impact will also extend the understanding 
on the role of social capital on innovation whether it 
compliments or substitutes the formal institution. Second, 
while most institutions-innovation analysis focuses on 
average effects, this study aims to examine whether the 
institutions-innovation relationship varies with different 
levels of innovational intensity. Overall, by examining 
the different dimensions of an institutions impact on 
innovation we will fortify the currently established 
institution-innovation framework.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature. Section 
3 specifies the empirical model, estimation methods 
and the data used in this study. Section 4 presents the 
estimated results and their discussion. Lastly, Section 5 
concludes the main finding and policy implication from 
this study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS
As one of the earliest works establishing the relationship 
between institutional quality and innovation, Freeman 
(1987) has shown that quality of institution is important 
in the process of creating and diffusing technology. In 
his words, he found that in some institutions, when firms 
are left alone, they will engage in myopic innovation 
process which will only maximize profit in the short-run. 
Hence, he suggests that suitable macro-institutions may 
provide proper incentives for innovation by changing 
a firms’ innovation behavior which will then focus on 
long-term profit maximization. In his books, he further 
recites evidence from Japan in explaining the role of 
institutional quality with regards to technology policy. 
From his view, the superiority of Japan in innovation is 
due to its advantage of a “national system of innovation”. 
This system was a set of complex factors ranging from 
industrial policy and science policy and included basic 
education, industry structures, the tax system and wage 
incentives. Besides effective policy measurement, social 
institutions in Japan also contribute to its success. For 
instance, the strength of belief that getting educated is 
a moral duty; the degree of preference for cooperation 
over competition; the willingness of professional labor to 
work 80-hours per week during peak innovation periods. 
Hence, he basically draws out the earliest framework 
regarding how formal and informal institutions matter 
for innovational intensity. 
In response to this, Kostova (1997) introduced the 
concept of a three-dimensional country institutional 
profile to explain how a country’s governmental 
policies (regulatory dimension), widely shared social 
knowledge (cognitive dimension) and value systems 
(normative dimension) affect domestic business 
activities. Her works were later used by Busenitz, 
Gomez and Spencer (2000) to answer the question of 
entrepreneurial phenomena differences across countries. 
Here, we adopted Kostova’s approach to differentiate 
different institutional effect (e.g. formal and informal) 
to innovation. 
First, the regulatory dimension of institution 
consists of laws, regulations and government policies 
that provide support to new businesses, thus, reducing 
risks for individuals to start a business, and facilitating 
entrepreneur’s efforts to acquire resources such as grants 
and government sponsored programs. This dimension 
represents the ability of law and regulation to protect 
the interests of inventors such as enforcement efficiency 
and copyright protection (Ginarte & Park 1997; Blind 
2012). On a broader prospect, the regulatory dimension 
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also relates to governance indicators such as government 
stability, corruption control and bureaucratic quality 
which are essential for the efficiency of enforcement of 
established law and regulation.
Second, the cognitive dimension of institution 
consists of social shared knowledge or experience 
of society regarding the process of entrepreneurship. 
Specifically, particular issues and knowledge sets become 
institutionalised and certain information becomes part of 
a shared social knowledge (Busenitz & Barney 1997; Lau 
& Woodman 1995). In adopting this view to innovation 
theory, it is necessary to study the ability of knowledge 
to spread within a society. Firms need prior related 
knowledge to assimilate and use new knowledge that 
is critical for innovative capability (Cohen & Levinthal 
1990). The diffusion of new knowledge then relies on the 
established social networks and structures to determine 
the speed and to what extent information is shared within 
a community.
Lastly, the normative dimension of institution is 
related to the value placed by a society in defining 
entrepreneurship. This value then depends on norm, 
culture and belief of a particular society (Busenitz & 
Lau 1996; Knight 1997; Tiessen 1997). Normative 
dimension institution is enforced by the normative 
mechanism regulating individual behaviour. The 
normative mechanisms explicitly or implicitly force 
entrepreneurs to adhere to the code of conduct that is set 
out by a specific community such as industries, business 
associations, families and ethnic groups. The normative 
dimension can be applied through informal mechanisms 
such as trust (Welter 2005). To this extent, trust fosters 
cooperation between individuals (Fukuyama 1995) and 
enables information sharing via network (Tsai & Ghoshal 
1998). Thus, trust lubricates knowledge sharing via 
network and hence, the creation of new ideas.
From the above discussion, the regulatory 
dimension of institution refers to formal institutions 
that matter to innovation. On the other hand, the 
cognitive-normative dimension of institution is 
intrinsically social capital. Since our major concern 
in this study is to examine how governance and social 
capital influence innovative activity, we will narrow 
our scope by reviewing existing literature on the 
proposed issue in the following section.
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS
In view of the influence of the regulatory framework 
on innovation, the effects of regulation on innovation 
take two forms. First, compliance with regulations (like 
tax) reduces the available resources for investment 
in research and development (Craft 2006). Second, 
regulation changes firms’ incentive to invest in research 
and development. Here, a regulation scheme such as 
patent protection might motivate a firm to invest in R&D 
(Carlin & Soskiuce 2006), whereas schemes such as 
price restrictions and product market rules may reduce 
firms’ incentive for innovative activities. As for empirical 
works, Van Waarden (2001) analysed both direct and 
indirect effects of formal regulation and litigation on 
innovation in the United States and the Netherlands. 
Based on his findings, economies with legal systems that 
are more effective in reducing risk and uncertainty are 
more innovative. 
Blind (2012) extended regulatory theory by 
differentiating the regulatory effect into economic 
regulation, social regulation, and institutional regulation. 
First, economic regulation focuses on the influence of 
competition policies, price regulation, natural monopoly 
regulation, market entry regulations, and public 
utilities on firms’ innovation decisions. He argued 
that although competition encourages innovation, 
this statement is valid only when optimal competition 
exists in the market. When competition becomes so 
intense that imitation activities become more attractive 
than innovation activities, the positive impact may 
change to negative.2 Second, Blind used environmental 
regulation to describe the influence of social regulation 
on firms’ innovation. Here, the social perceptions of 
environmental issues that later form new environmental 
regulations are a factor that motivates firms’ innovation 
(Kemp 1998). New environmental regulations have 
resulted in improvements in machinery and equipment 
that enable firms to introduce new production techniques 
into the industry. 
Finally, institutional regulation refers to the 
institutional framework that is implemented by 
authorities. Blind defined institutional regulation as the 
effectiveness of the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights (IPR), which secures the interests of innovators.3 
Blind’s proposition regarding the regulation of innovation 
is indeed groundbreaking. However, the use of IPR as a 
proxy for the institutional framework that determines 
innovation is statutory. IPR alone is inadequate to 
eliminate all risk and uncertainty for firms to invest in 
R&D.4 Given that R&D is a form of firm investment that 
anticipates future profit from a successful innovation, a 
firm’s decisions on innovation should also be influenced 
by other countries’ institutional profiles, such as 
governance quality.5 
Specifically, the fundamental role of a patent 
protection framework is to promote the creation 
and diffusion of technology by granting limited 
monopoly power to an innovator over a technological 
solution. However, although many countries have 
adopted a sufficient patent protection framework, its 
implementation in terms of protecting the benefits of an 
innovator is far from effective (Ginarte & Park 1997). A 
country’s ability to enforce a law depends on the quality 
of its government agencies, such as its political stability 
and judiciary system. That is, a better judiciary system 
leads to better implementation of patent law and, hence, 
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promotes innovation.6 In addition, political stability, 
government accountability, and control of corruption 
should also have a positive impact on patent law and, 
subsequently, innovative activities (Varsakelis 2006). The 
relationship between corruption and innovation was also 
explored by Prashanth (2008), who found that corruption 
has a negative effect on product innovation in African 
firms. Later, Anokhin and Schulze (2009) proposed that 
efforts to control corruption increase firms’ level of trust 
in the government’s ability to enforce the laws and rules 
of trade. Thus, better control of corruption also promotes 
higher levels of innovation and entrepreneurship. An 
absence of such trust will limit a firm’s ability in terms 
of trade, productivity, and innovation investment because 
it will need to direct more resources to monitoring and 
other transaction costs.
The empirical analysis on the role of formal 
institutions on innovation has been done. In the case 
of China, Kafouros, Piperropoulos and Zhang (2015) 
highlight that uneven institutional evolution affects 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs), 
the level of international openness, the quality of 
universities and research institutes across regions 
and thus the degree to which Chinese emerging 
market enterprises (EMEs) benefit from academic 
collaborations. Their findings demonstrate that sub-
national institutional variations have a profound impact 
on the relationship between academic collaborations and 
firms’ innovation performance. The findings suggest 
that institutional development evolves in different 
ways across sub-national Chinese regions because 
the assumption of institutional homogeneity within a 
given country is invalid. On the other hand, Robin and 
Schubert (2013) investigate the impact of cooperation 
with public research on firms’ product and process 
innovations in France and Germany using Community 
Innovation Survey data from 2004 and 2008. They find 
that cooperating with public research increases product 
innovation but has no effect on process innovation, 
which depends more on firms’ openness. Their finding 
also suggests that the increase in product innovation is 
much higher in Germany than in France.
Wang (2013) investigates the influence of 
institutional quality, particularly political risk indicators, 
on innovation intensity. He used five instrumental 
variables (latitude, ethnolinguistic diversity, crops, 
mortality, and engfrac) for institutions. This setting of 
the econometric model implies that the institutions are 
endogenous in nature. Based on his empirical analysis, 
he reported a significant direct effect of institutions on 
countries’ innovation intensity. However, the author’s 
works suggested that there are no unique differences 
between formal and informal institutions in influencing 
countries’ innovation. In the following section, we 
will review how social capital influences innovative 
activities and why its impact might differ from that of 
formal institutions.
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS
The original concept of social capital can be traced back 
to the work of Hanifan (1916). In his work, social capital 
was defined as “those tangible assets that count for most 
in daily lives of people: namely goodwill, fellowship, 
sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals 
and families who make a social unit”. Works using a 
modern concept of social capital were popularized in the 
1980s and accelerated in the 1990s. Such works include 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), who related social 
capital to actual or potential resources within a social 
structure that collectively supports each of its members 
and is linked to the possession of a durable network of 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition. Additionally, Coleman (1990) argued 
that social capital is defined by its function. He suggested 
that social capital is not a single entity, but a variety 
of different entities. These entities share two common 
characteristics: They all consist of some aspect of a 
social structure and they all facilitate certain actions of 
individuals who are within that structure. In contrast, 
Putnam (1993) suggested three specific components 
within social capital: moral obligations and norms, 
social values (especially trust), and social networks that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. 
Fukuyama (1995) later simplified the term and defined 
social capital as people’s ability to work together for 
common purposes in groups and organizations. Overall, 
all these previous works defined social capital as links, 
shared values, and understandings in society that foster 
trust and, ultimately, cooperation within a community.7 
In other words, social capital entails values that promote 
cooperation within society.8
How does social capital influence innovation? 
Because innovation diffusion and firm cooperation are 
crucial to the creation of new ideas, social capital should 
have a major impact on innovation. The underlying theory 
for the social capital-innovation relationship is based on 
notable network theory. As a beginning, we refer to Cohen 
and Levinthal (1990), who reported that firms’ absorptive 
capacity is critical for innovation capabilities. In other 
words, the adoption of prior related knowledge is a source 
for the creation of new knowledge. However, how fast is 
the innovation diffusion process within a community? The 
structure of social networks fills the role that determines 
the extent of information spread within a community; 
Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1997) explored the social 
network effect on the extent of innovation diffusion. A 
positive feedback loop increased the number of adopters 
and created stronger bandwagon pressure. Stronger 
bandwagon pressure then encouraged more adopters. The 
authors proposed that both the number of network links 
and the idiosyncrasies of network structures can have 
very large effects on the extent of innovation diffusion 
among members of a social network.9 The transfer of 
new knowledge among organisations then facilitates the 
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creation of new knowledge within organisations (Kogut 
& Zander 1992; Tsai 2000). Tsai (2001) found that the 
interaction between absorptive capacity and network 
position has significant positive effects on the innovation 
and performance of food manufacturing companies. 
Previous literature has highlighted the importance 
of social networks in facilitating the creation of new 
knowledge, but the transfer of knowledge will not 
happen without trust (Tsai & Ghoshal 1998). Trust can 
influence innovation through several mechanisms. First, 
trust reduces monitoring costs for possible malfeasance 
and non-compliance by partners and reduces the need 
for written contracts (Knack & Keefer 1997; Tamaschke 
2003). Lower monitoring costs will enable firms to 
allocate more resources to innovative activity. Second, 
members of a society, including investors, become 
less risk averse in a society with higher trust. Thus, 
higher trust encourages investors to invest more in 
R&D projects (Akcomak & Bass terWeel 2006). Third, 
trust enables information sharing and cooperation 
between firms in initiating innovative cooperation 
projects. Repeated cooperation that develops trust then 
encourages firms to engage in riskier and more radical 
innovative projects. Finally, high trust in an established 
institution, such as the government and the legal system, 
motivates innovative activity. This trust ensures that 
inventors invest in innovative efforts because they trust 
that their benefit from a successful innovation will be 
protected (Dakhli & de Clercq 2004; Tabellini 2006). A 
norm is treated as an element that fosters trust. Shared 
norms lubricate the function of a society by fostering 
trust and reducing the incentive of its members to cheat 
(Lee, Jeong & Chae 2011).
As for empirical works, Landry et al. (2002) 
investigated the effects of networks and trust on the 
likelihood of innovation and innovation radicalness. 
In their findings, an innovation-increasing effect of the 
network was detected, whereas the effect of trust was 
insignificant. In contrast, in a firm-level analysis, Tsai 
and Ghoshal (1998) found that both social interaction 
and trustworthiness increased the number of innovations. 
Similarly, Ackomak and terWeel (2006) found that 
trust has a positive influence on the number of patent 
applications by analyzing European region-level data. 
Finally, Kaasa, Kaldaru and Parts (2007) examined the 
different dimensions of social capital and institutional 
quality in innovation activity. They employed cluster 
analysis of 29 European countries and concluded that 
different dimensions of social capital have different 
impacts on innovative activity. 
This study contributes to the literature in three 
important aspects. First, this study adopts network 
theory as the fundamental theory to explain the effect 
of institutional quality through the social dimension, 
which is currently underutilized in the current literature. 
Second, this work focuses on comparing the effect of 
governance quality and social capital on innovation. 
Social networks that determine the degree of firms’ 
absorptive capacity might be a complement for good 
governance in encouraging innovative activity. Hence, 
governance quality might not fully explain innovation 
phenomena because social capital affects the speed 
of innovation diffusion, which is fundamental for the 
creation of new ideas. Third, whereas most institution-
innovation literature has focused on the average impact of 
institutions on innovation, we aim to examine whether the 
role of institutions differs by country, based on different 
initial levels of innovation. We hope to explain why 
improving the law structure in certain countries fails to 
promote the country’s innovation activity.
The main differences between this study and the 
cited works are: 1) This study adopted network theory as 
fundamental theory to explain the effect of institutional 
quality through a social dimension which is currently 
underutilized by current literature. 2) This work 
focuses on comparing the effect of governance quality 
and social capital on innovation. Social networks that 
determine the degree of firms’ absorptive capacity might 
be a compliment for good governance to encourage 
innovative activity. Hence, governance quality might 
not be able to fully explain innovation phenomena 
as social capital influences the speed of innovation 
diffusion that is fundamental for creation of new ideas. 
3) While most institution-innovation literature focuses 
on the average impact of institutions on innovation, we 
aim to examine whether the role of institutions behave 
differently on a country by country basis with different 
initial innovation intensity. This is to explain why even 
if law structure is improved in a country; it may fail to 
promote innovation activity. 
METHODOLOGY
EMPIRICAL MODEL, ESTIMATION METHODS AND  
THE DATA
In the first part of this study, we aim to distinguish the 
impacts of formal and informal institutions on innovation. 
Therefore, the empirical specification is focused on the 
determinant of innovation by testing the roles of formal 
institution (governance) and informal institution (social 
capital). Hence, this study attempts to estimate the 
following Ad-hoc equation;
Ai = β0+ β1 INSi + β2 Xi + εi  (1)
Ai = γ 0 + γ1 SCi + γ2 Xi + εi  (2)
where A is innovation, INS is ICRG institution index, 
SC is social capital, X is vector of exogenous control 
variables (i.e. human capital, trade openness, FDI and 
GDP per capita), ε is the random error term represents 
natural logarithm. The focus in this study is to examine 
the size, sign and significance of the coefficients β1 and γ1 
in determining whether formal and informal institutions 
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yield a varied impact on innovation. As for the expected 
sign, both β1 and γ1 are expected to be positive to show 
that higher institutional quality and stronger social 
ties promote innovation activity. Specifically, higher 
institutional quality minimises the distortion in patent law 
enforcement and hence encourages innovative activity 
(Freeman 1987; Van Waarden 2001; Blind 2012; Wang 
2013). On the other hand, stronger social ties help to 
diffuse frontier innovation and later promote innovative 
activity in the industry (Cohen & Levinthal 1990; 
Abrahamson & Rosenkopf 1997; Tsai 2001; Kaasa et al. 
2007). Similarly, all control variables are also expected to 
have a positive impact on innovation. Hence, Equations 
(1) and (2) serve as a baseline specification in this part 
of the study. The above equation will be estimated by 
robust standard error OLS estimator.
QUANTILE ESTIMATION
In the second part of this study, we adopted quantile 
regression to estimate the effect of explanatory variables 
on the dependent variable at different points of the 
dependent variable’s conditional distribution. Quantile 
regressions were first introduced by Koenker and Bassett 
(1978) as a ‘robust’ regression technique which allows for 
estimation where typical assumption of normality of the 
error term that might not be strictly satisfied. It was later 
used to get information about points in the distribution of 
the dependent variable other than the conditional mean 
(Buchinsky 1994, 1995; Eide & Showalter 1997; Koenker 
2005). Here, the quantile regression model in our study 
can be written as:
Ai =Zi'βθ + µ0i;Qθ (Ai|Zi)= Zi'βθ (3)
Where Ai denotes innovation intensity and the vector of 
explanatory variables. βθ is the vector of parameters to be 
estimated for a given value of the quantiles θ. is the θth 
quantile of the conditional distribution of the innovation 
intensity given the vector of explanatory variables Zi. 
The estimation of the quantile parameters is done by 
solving a minimisation problem where the corresponding 
residuals have to be weighted. In this application, we use 
a simultaneous quantile regression model which allows 
us to test whether the coefficients are similar across the 
conditional quantiles. Standard errors are obtained by 
using the bootstrap method suggested by Gould (1997). 
Finally, our regression estimates at five different quantiles 
ranging from 0.10 to 0.90.
THE DATA
For the purpose of empirical analysis, data from several 
sources were extracted. First, the formal institutions 
dataset employed was from the International Country 
Risk Guide – a monthly publication of Political Risk 
Services (PRS). Following Seldadyo, Nugroho and 
Haan (2007), five PRS indicators were used to measures 
overall formal institutions environment. 1) Democratic 
accountability (6 point scale) – measures how responsive 
government is to its people. Governments’ that are less 
responsive will be more likely to fail, peacefully under 
a democratic society but possibly violently in a non-
democratic one. 2) Government stability (12 point scale) 
which is an assessment of the government’s ability to 
carry out its declared programs and stay in office. It’s 
assigned based on three components: government unity, 
legislative strength and popular support. 3) Bureaucratic 
quality (4 point scale) – which represents the bureaucratic 
strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes 
in policy or interruptions in government services and 
where it has an established mechanism for recruitment 
and training. 4) Corruption (6 point scale) – which reflects 
the likelihood of an official to demand an illegal payment 
or use their position or power to their own advantage. 
5) Law and order (6 point scale) – which measure the 
strength and impartiality of a legal system as well as 
popular observance of the laws. These five variables 
are normally scaled from 0 to 10 where higher value 
implies better institutions. The formal institutional quality 
variable was obtained by summing the five PRS indicators. 
On the other hand, the social capital index employed 
was assembled by Lee et al. (2011). The data was 
extracted from the principal component of 44 variables 
covering 72 countries. The index includes 4 main 
components of social capital namely social trust, norms, 
networks and social structure. Due to the limitations of 
the social capital index which covers only a 72 cross 
sectional unit, we perform cross sectional analysis in 
this section to enable comparison between formal and 
informal institutions effect to innovation10. 
For the measurement of innovation, we used 
patent application from World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO). For estimation purposes, patent 
application is transformed into patent application per 
total labor (P/L). As for control variables, total population 
in tertiary schooling was proxied as human capital 
which is assembled by Barro and Lee (2000). National 
import and export ratio is proxied as trade openness. 
The data together with FDI inflows and GDP per capita 
was extracted from World Development Indicator (WDI). 
For the purpose of cross-sectional analysis, the above 
mentioned data was averaged from year 2006 to 2010 and 
62 developed and developing countries were selected as 
the sample set. The descriptive statistic for the data used 
in this study is presented in Table 1. As shown in Table 
1, standard deviation for social capital is higher than 
institutions. This suggests that the divergence on social 
structure is greater than legal structure in our sample. 
Hence, our core interest in this study is to examine 
whether a cross-country variation in social capital yields 
a better understanding in explaining the institution-
innovation relationship. 
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Figure 1 displays the correlation between innovation 
intensity (P/L) and formal institutions proxy by 
institutional quality index (INS) for the covered sample 
cross-countries. From Figure 1, the institutions data 
indicate a strong correlation with innovation intensity 
(R2 = 0.258). Meanwhile, Figure 2 illustrate a relatively 
stronger correlation between innovation and informal 
institutions (social capital) (R2 = 0.461). The simple 
correlation test hints that social capital somehow 
has a greater explanatory power over institutions in 
explaining countries innovation level. However, note 
that correlation does not imply causation but as a 
preliminary examination on the relationship between 
both variables. Overall, both figures suggest countries 
with better institutions and social capital tend to have 
intense innovation activity.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
RESULT OF THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS ON INNOVATIONS
This section presents the empirical findings using the 
econometric approaches discussed in Section 3. The 
main empirical results are presented in Table 2 while 
Tables 3 and 4 report the estimation of related sub-
indicator on innovation11. In particular, Model (1) and 
Model (3) present the bivariate analysis of institutions-
innovation relationship. Model (2) and Model (4) extend 
the analysis by incorporating other control variables into 
Model (1) and Model (3). A subsequent endogeneity test 
is performed to test the endogeneity of variables e.g. 
formal and informal institutions. The test adopted the 
Wu-Hausman approach discussed in Section 3 where the 
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TABLE 1. Descriptive statistic for cross-countries data
Mean Std. dev Min Max Obs
Innovation (P/L)
Institution index (INS)
Social capital index (SC)
GDP (LGDP)
FDI (LFDI)
Import (LIM)
Human capital (secondary) (LHCS)
Human capital (tertiary) (LHCT)
Religion
Latitude
English origin
-3.605
1.368
0.697
4.004
5.707
10.886
30.617
11.030
13.955
0.415
0.210
0.669
0.068
0.143
0.581
5.769
0.648
13.363
6.671
24.839
0.183
0.410
-6.521
1.255
0.314
2.565
0.256
9.530
0.91
0.5
0
0.011
0
-2.164
1.492
0.919
5.163
31.599
12.319
61.33
26.13
96.6
0.722
1
62
62
62
62
62
62
62
62
62
62
62
Note: (P/L) is measured in percentage point. GDP, FDI, import, human capital, religion and latitude are measured in levels. 
ICRG and social capital are the overall measures of relevant sub-component of institutions indicators. English legal 
origin is a dummy variable. All variables are transformed into natural logarithm except English origin.
FIGURE 1. Scatter Plot of Innovation (P/L) and Formal Institutions (INS)
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FIGURE 2. Scatter Plot of Innovation (P/L) and Informal Institutions (SC)
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TABLE 2. OLS Estimate on the Impact of Institutions on Innovations
Dependent variable: Innovation (P/L)
Formal Institutions Informal Institutions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Formal Institutions (ICRG) 5.034
(4.57)***
3.047
(2.53)**
- -
Informal Institutions
(Social Capital)
- - 3.177
(7.16)***
2.802
(4.63)***
GDP percapita - 0.165
(1.30)
- -0.037
(-0.29)
FDI - -0.006
(-0.49)
- -0.011
(-0.99)
Imports (IM) - 0.270
(2.24)**
- 0.224
(2.07)**
Human Capital (HCT) - 0.023
(2.04)**
- 0.009
(0.86)
Observations 62 62 62 62
R2 0.246 0.377 0.452 0.498
Endogeneity Test ρ-value 0.130 0.215 0.550 0.789
Notes: Figure in parentheses is t statistics produced by using OLS estimators. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
null hypothesis of this test indicates proposed variable 
to be exogenous in nature.
From Table 2, Model (1) and Model (2) present the 
estimated result of Equation (1) using robust standard 
error OLS estimator. In Model (1), the result suggests 
that the overall measure of formal institutions (ICRG) 
exhibits a strong effect on innovation. Specifically, a 
1% increase in an institutions quality is associated with 
an increase of 5% in innovation. In Model (2), other 
determinants of innovation such as GDP, FDI, import 
and human capital are included into the Model (1) to 
serve as control variables. Again, formal institutions 
are suggested to have a significant positive impact 
to innovation even after controlling from the control 
variables. This finding is consistent with recent 
studies which have also found a positive relationship 
between institutions and innovations. Therefore, the 
finding supports the view that an improvement on 
institutional quality, e.g. legal framework is needed 
to encourage innovation activity. However, the 
subsequent endogeneity test shows that the institutional 
quality is exogenous with the endogeneity test failing 
to reject null hypothesis of exogenous. Thus, OLS 
coefficients on institutional quality are suggested to 
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be exogenous and relieve from omitted variable bias 
or measurement errors.12 
Next, Model (3) and Model (4) present the estimated 
result of Equation (2). The results show that the informal 
institutions (social capital) also exhibit a significant 
positive impact on innovation. The results are robust 
even after including control variables into the model. The 
findings are also consistent with previous literature which 
suggests a positive impact of social capital on innovation. 
Specifically, higher social capital will foster trust and 
hence, promote knowledge sharing and cooperation 
which is essential in initiating innovation activity. The 
subsequent Wu-Hausman endogeneity test also suggested 
that social capital is exogenous and the OLS coefficient 
is consistent. Thus, the finding suggests a revival of 
conventional wisdom that institutions are exogenous or 
at least not correlated with the error term in the model 
in econometric sense. 
Furthermore, Table 3 and 4 shows the estimation of 
related institutions sub-indicator on innovation. Here, 
Table 3 shows the estimated results on the impact of 
five ICRG sub-indicators on innovation. Out of these 
indicators, corruption controls are worth examining with 
others indicators failing to individually demonstrate 
a convincing impact toward innovation. It shows that 
corruption control which is viewed as a distortion factor 
in legal structure has a positive significant impact on 
country innovation. This implies that higher corruption 
control will encourage innovation activity. Nevertheless, 
all social capital sub-indicators except social networks 
are suggested to have a positive significant impact on 
a country’s innovation level as shown in Table 4. The 
implication of these findings suggests that a combination 
of the institutions sub-components is more viable in 
explaining cross-countries innovation compared to 
examining each sub-component individually.
TABLE 3. Result of formal institutions sub-indicators on innovation
Dependent variable: Innovation (P/L)
Control of 
Corruption 
(CORR)
Democratic 
Accountability 
(DA)
Government 
Stability 
(GS)
Bureaucracy 
Quality 
(BQ)
Law and 
Order 
(ROL)
Formal Institutions 1.174
(2.41)**
0.581
(1.09)
1.087
(0.83)
0.866
(1.80)*
0.694
(1.07)
LGDP 0.199
(1.60)
0.212
(1.58)
0.273
(2.12)**
0.215
(1.69)*
0.207
(1.53)
FDI -0.005
(-0.42)
0.002
(0.18)
0.001
(0.09)
-0.001
(-0.10)
-0.001
(-0.00)
Imports (IM) 0.256
(2.07)**
0.358
(2.96)***
0.355
(2.93)***
0.293
(2.36)**
0.337
(2.75)***
Human Capital (HCT) 0.024
(2.22)**
0.025
(2.17)**
0.031
(2.65)**
0.025
(2.27)**
0.025
(2.17)**
Observations 62 62 62 62 62
R2 0.371 0.320 0.314 0.343 0.254
Notes: Figure in parentheses is t statistics produced by using OLS estimators. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
TABLE 4. Result of informal institutions sub-indicators on innovation
Dependent variable: Innovation (P/L)
Trust Norm Network Structure
Social Capital 3.254
(4.68)***
1.979
(2.96)***
0.764
(1.27)
3.001
(4.73)***
LGDP -0.060
(-0.47)
0.110
(0.85)
0.259
(2.05)**
-0.045
(-0.36)
FDI -0.008
(-0.73)
-0.008
(-0.61)
0.003
(0.22)
-0.012
(-1.05)
Imports (IM) 0.199
(1.82)*
0.254
(2.14)**
0.339
(2.80)***
0.261
(2.48)**
Human Capital (HCT) 0.010
(0.98)
0.023
(2.16)**
0.024
(2.08)**
0.008
(0.79)
Observations 62 62 62 62
R2 0.501 0.399 0.325 0.504
Notes: Figure in parentheses is t statistics produced by using OLS estimators. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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QUANTILE REGRESSION APPROACH
In this section we present our quantile regression 
estimates of the effect of institutions on innovation 
level. We compare the OLS estimates with the 0.10, 0.25, 
0.50, 0.75, and 0.90 quantiles estimates. The results are 
presented in the following table and figures.
In Table 5, OLS result suggests that institutional 
quality, volume of import and human capital is found 
to have significant positive impact toward innovation 
level. However, the quantile regression suggests that 
there are some important differences across different 
points in the conditional distribution of institutions 
index. At the lower end of the distribution, the 
coefficients of institutional quality are positive and 
insignificant; but, they are positive and significant 
after median quantiles. Besides that, the coefficient of 
institutional quality increases significantly at higher 
quantiles. This suggests that a country beyond 50th 
percentile of the conditional distribution of innovation 
level is benefiting from a stronger formal institution 
and the effect is magnified for a country with higher 
innovation level. 
On the other hand, Table 6 presents the OLS and 
quantile results for the social-innovation framework. 
From the table, OLS results found that social capital and 
import have significant impact on country innovation 
level. As for quantile regression, social capital shows 
a significant positive impact even at the lowest end of 
the distribution. Surprisingly, the coefficient is highest 
amongst other quantiles. Nonetheless, the coefficient is 
not significantly different between the 25th percentiles 
to 90th percentile. This finding implies that country 
innovations can benefit from social capital improvement 
even when the initial innovation level is low. Hence, 
a country with low initial innovation level is advised 
to focus on improving social capital to promote the 
innovation level. However, formal institutions should 
be improved as a measurement for long term innovation 
stimulus policy.
TABLE 5. Comparison of OLS and quantile regression results using ratio of patent application per worker as the dependent variable
Sample: 62 OLS Quantile
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
LINS 3.047**
(1.203)
1.443
(2.626)
2.309
(2.195)
3.194***
(0.804)
3.832***
(1.420)
6.397**
(2.639)
LGDP 0.165
(0.127)
0.055
(0.305)
0.042
(0.211)
0.120
(0.131)
0.090
(0.159)
-0.188
(0.263)
LFDI -0.006
(0.013)
-0.014
(0.028)
0.007
(0.019)
-0.014
(0.017)
-0.023
(0.021)
-0.035
(0.034)
LIMPORT 0.270**
(0.121)
0.523*
(0.296)
0.514*
(0.283)
0.197
(0.173)
0.035
(0.141)
-0.124
(0.201)
LHCT 0.023**
(0.011)
0.023
(0.018)
0.016
(0.018)
0.031**
(0.015)
0.019
(0.016)
0.017
(0.018)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are given below each parameter estimate (heteroskedasticity robust for OLS; bootstrapped for quanties). ***, ** 
and * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
TABLE 6. Comparison of OLS and quantile regression results using ratio of patent application per worker as the dependent variable
Sample: 62 OLS Quantile
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
LSC 2.802***
(0.605)
3.255**
(1.382)
2.163**
(0.916)
2.840***
(0.775)
2.073**
(0.865)
2.532**
(1.156)
LGDP -0.037
(0.126)
-0.015
(0.272)
-0.077
(0.159)
-0.153
(0.185)
0.030
(0.226)
-0.059
(0.310)
LFDI -0.011
(0.012)
-0.025
(0.019)
0.001
(0.016)
-0.013
(0.018)
-0.018
(0.028)
0.028
(0.031)
LIMPORT 0.224**
(0.108)
0.513*
(0.263)
0.358*
(0.211)
0.178
(0.152)
0.073
(0.163)
0.276
(0.190)
LHCT 0.009
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.020)
0.018
(0.018)
0.015
(0.013)
0.016
(0.012)
0.022
(0.018)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are given below each parameter estimate (heteroskedasticity robust for OLS; bootstrapped for quanties). ***, ** 
and * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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CONCLUSSION
In this paper, we aim to distinguish between the impacts 
of formal and informal institutions when viewed against 
a country’s innovation level. By employing robust 
standard error OLS and quantile regression analysis 
in cross-country specification, we examine current 
institutions-innovation framework.
Based on the conventional average estimator, the 
findings conclude the following; First, institutional 
quality and social capital have a direct impact 
on innovation level. The relationships are robust 
even after controlling for the effects of others 
innovation determinants. The findings suggest that 
social capital compliments institutional quality in 
determining countries innovation level. This implies 
that although sound legal structures are a condition 
that encourage innovation, strong social capital that 
promotes knowledge sharing and creation of ideas is 
equally important in promoting innovation. Second, 
institutional quality and social capital are suggested 
to be exogenous in nature. Contrary to other literature, 
our findings indicate that both the formal and informal 
institutions in our study are exogenous as a result of 
failing to reject null hypothesis of endogeneity test. 
This provides an insight of reviving the conventional 
idea where institutions are exogenous rather than 
endogenous. Third, a combination of institutions sub-
indicator is more viable in explaining cross-countries 
innovation diversity as compared to examining each 
indicator individually. This implies that the impact of 
institutions on innovation is the result of a combination 
of sub-indicators combination rather than effecting 
innovation separately.
In addition, we used the quantile approach to 
examine the differences in the institutions-innovation 
relationship at different points of conditional 
distribution of innovation level. The findings have some 
important implications for innovation policy. First, 
strengthening institutional quality is only beneficial to 
those countries with high innovation levels. A country 
with a low innovation level does not benefit much from 
it. Improvement of institutional quality is conditionally 
meaningful to countries with a high innovation level or 
long-run innovation stimulus policy. Second, countries 
with weak initial innovation are better-off improving 
social capital to promote innovation activity. Thus, 
high social capital, which is the essence of creation of 
ideas is important as the initial stage for countries to 
promote innovation activity. The role of institutional 
quality only comes later when the respective countries 
have accumulated adequate intellectual property 
that aims to protect the well-being of inventor. This 
implies that country with relatively low innovation 
level (mostly developing countries) should focus more 
on the development of social capital in stimulating 
innovation activities.
ENDNOTES
1 Such works include Wang (2013) which investigated the 
influence of institutional quality particularly political 
risk indicator to innovation intensity. In his works, he 
used informal institutions indicator such as latitude, 
ethnolinguistic diversity, crops, mortality and engfrac as 
instrument for institutions. This setting of econometric 
model implies that the impact of informal institutions on 
innovation only through formal institutions. Based on his 
empirical analysis, he found a significant direct effect of 
institutions on R&D.
2 The inverse U-shaped relationship between competition 
and innovation was empirically proven by Aghion et al. 
(2005). 
3 Similar work has been done by Berkowitz, Lin and Ma 
(2015), who found that property rights have a significant 
impact on firm value. Thus, a sound legal framework 
would encourage innovation activities. 
4 Jorde and Teece (1990) and VanWaarden (2001) discussed 
the risk and uncertainty in innovation.
5 Busse and Hefeker (2007) found that political risk-based 
indicators such as government stability, internal-external 
conflict, corruption and ethnic tension, law and order, 
democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality are 
significant determinants for foreign direct investment 
inflow, especially for developing countries.
6 However, Balsmeier and Delanote (2015) find that only 
young innovative firms benefit from stronger property 
rights protection. 
7 Here, Nurullah and Christian (2016) found that social trust 
has a positive effect on delegation. Hence, higher social 
trust could minimize monitoring costs in an innovative 
project.
8 The OECD defined social capital as “networks together with 
shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate 
co-operation within or among groups”. The networks 
can be real-world links between groups or individuals, 
i.e., networks of friends, networks of families, networks 
of former colleagues, etc. Our shared norms, values and 
understandings are less concrete than our social networks.
9 Works such as Galbraith (1977) and Gresov and Stephens 
(1993) have also suggested that inter-unit links among 
organisations enable the transfer of knowledge.
10 Among 72 countries social capital assembled, we only 
select 62 countries due to data unavailability in others 
variables. 
11 This includes the sub-indicator of formal institutions 
namely democratic accountability, government stability, 
bureaucracy quality, corruption and law and order. For the 
sub-indicator of social capital are trust, norm, network and 
social structure. 
12 Instrumental variable (IV) estimator is employed in this 
study to test the endogeneity of institutions variables. 
However, the results are not shown as the endoegeneity test 
fail to reject null hypothesis of endogeneity which implies 
that the institutions variables are exogenous in nature. 
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